ON THIS PROJECT

## (1) Introduction

For the idea to undertake a project of this kind I am indebted to a question once put to me by my Japanese wife. Coming to Europe for the first time, knowing some social science theory and having some pointers on European time and space much in the same way as a European intellectual has about Asia, her problem was: what happened in European history? To get an answer to this the first idea was, of course, to buy a couple of books on European history. As is well known one very quickly gets lost in details, at the micro level in time and space, or one ends up with the school text-book type of trivialities. The next solution was to try one of the many historical "atlases" which gives in chronological succession, often country by country or region by region, what has been con-sidered to be the major events. Much of interest emerges, but no graphic picture, no basic idea.

Then, there are the big theoretical schemes: Marx, Sorokin, Toynbee and others. The difficulty here is that the theories are grand, the visions are tremendous, but they only occasionally, and mainly where it fits the author genius, lands on specific points in time and space. It is a little bit like using the general theory of psychoanalysis as a guide in inter-human affairs: one has a magnificent theory and an enourmous amount of day-to-day impressions, but much is needed to tie them together.

I could imagine putting the question to myself in the following way. If one should, taking into consideration modern social science with its typologies, but above all with its basic variables and data gathering techniques in addition to its theories, try to say in one hundred pages what happened in European history, what would one say? (As a matter of fact, I could imagine that one way of proceeding with this project would be to put exactly that question to a number of European historians, and try to learn from their insights.)

Concretely, I could imagine that one way of proceeding might be as follows.

One would start trying to make a list of some of the basic, "objective" parameters of human existence, such as geographical variables, climatical ones, data about the biosphere (on vegetation, animal population, human population), data on cultivated area,

agricultural production, something on industrial production, commerce, means of transportation and communication of various kinds, perhaps some data on population composition. Much of this exists in various forms, often estimated, but even if the estimates are rough they may be quite sufficient for the type of theoretical structure that reasonably could be developed. Some of these variables are constants, many of them show some type of monotonous increase or decrease, some of them show fluctuations. There is no limit to how many one could include, the real point would be to try to exercise some constraint, to focus on essentials. In this the task can be compared exactly to what is done today in comparative social and political analyses, for instance in development theory when societies are compared with each other.

These are variables, variables showing a certain continuity. When a variable shows a basic discontinuity that jump is called an event. Historians have been better at collecting events than working with continuously, meaning slowly, changing variables. Their technique has usually been to connect causally a chain of events, particularly events that can be referred to as acts by major actors. In the type of study I have in mind here I would play down, but certainly not to zero, the role of such events; and I would play up the role of variables showing a certain continuity. Very much emphasis would be placed on the pulsating movements of political systems, empires, kingdoms and what not, in an effort to grasp first of all graphically any type of rhythm in these pulsations, later on to link it to the "objective" variables and their change, interconnect them with theories of development, conflict and peace - particularly theories of imperialism that connect all three foci of research. Essentially there would be a search for pattern, possibly with the conclusion that there is no pattern discernable with this kind of method - possibly with the conclusion that the pulsations show a changing rhythm through time, more quick, more slow, a mixture of the two, and so on.

In the general field today referred to as future studies much effort has been put into the kind of thinking I am portraying here, but with a view towards the future rather than towards the past. However, the student of the future does not have to be accountable in terms of a confrontation with empirical data (he may have to be accountable from the point of view of basic values, however). In this case whatever one might develop would certainly have to stand some empirical test, although the idea would be to proceed inductively rather than deductively. Historical atlases would be made use of, as far as they can carry - which may not be very far. Certain types of events, such as battles for which relatively good data exist (at least where their location and dates are concerned, if not necessarily their magnitude) would be analyzed in terms of their background characteristics much as one would analyze today the incidents of, say, military coups d'etat in various countries.

Throughout the project various theories of development would be used as a basis for the understanding of the historicity of events and variables. Thus, there are theories available of economic growth through capitalistic accumulation in the center as well as erosion of various kinds in the periphery, there are theories of ecological change due to disturbance of natural balances, there are theories of state formation, of nation-building and so on. These theories are not to be tested, for they are usually all of them neither wrong nor false, only too general, but are rather used to generate

perspectives for data-collection. In the field of peace much re-
search has been done in the past, for instance by Sorokin and by
Richardson to look at the fluctuations in the use of violence, much
of that can possibly be made use of again in the light of more
modern research as to the accuracy of data. But in the inter-phase
between conflict and peace would come conceptions of structural
violence, of exploitation and inequality, which would be considerably
more difficult to translate into data.

In short, this project is an effort to try to do something of
the same to European history as social scientists have been doing
for the last decades at the synchronic level. In the first phase
social scientists had a tendency to proceed in a comparative manner,
seeing societies synchronically as disjoint, isolated realizations
of the human endeavour. Then, their perspective has changed, there
is much more emphasis on relations between societies than on dif-
ferences, and of explaining differences in terms of relations.

It may well be that in the first phase of the project here
mentioned, a very modest phase, a comparison should be carried out
between centuries in selected nations or regions, with an effort to
make some kind of characteristics profile. Here it becomes so much
more difficult because these profiles would obviously be related
historically through time, and also to some extent systemically
through space, at the same time. Which tie is stronger, the
historical one, keeping space constant, or the systemic one, keeping
time constant? Obviously, no dogmatic answer should be given to
this: it depends on how strongly the total system is tied together
at one point in time, for instance through communication and trans-
portation, through various of imperialism and so on - and it depends
on how strongly time segments of the same societies are kept together
through various types of continuities. As a matter of fact, one
theoretical fall-out from this project might be exactly in this
field: comparisons between synchronic and diachronic analyses.

I am perfectly aware that in proposing a project of this kind
one steps on practically speaking all the toes one can step in
history and social sciences. That is no source of worry. Like so
many others I am utterly convinced that history is the mother of
the social sciences, the womb from which they all come, and that it
is tragic that the off-spring has gotten so far away from the mother.
A project like this would, like many other projects in the world today,
contribute to bringing them together - but not at the micro level
(like when an historian uses modern political science methods to
analyze voting behavior in parliaments one century ago), but at the
macro level in time as well as in space. Further, if there are
strong intellectual feelings in connection with such things this is
in itself an indication that the project is of some potential
significance.

(2) On the methodology of the project

So far there are five methods that seem to recommend themselves
in connection with this project:

(1) Collection and analysis of data on general trends .

(2) Collection and analysis of data on specific events.

(3) Collection and analysis of long-term theories.

(4) Questionnaire and interviews with historians (and others).

(5) Monograph studies.

This is an effort to say something about the methods and how they are interrelated.

First, there is the idea of collecting trend data. These would be aggregate data on ecological, structural and cultural characteristics. The major problem would be to decide on space and time units. Thus, there is hardly much meaning to data on "Europe" as a whole, and data for sub-divisions of Europe would not be comparable over long time period (except, perhaps, for France and Britain and some others) because of the changing borders. There are corresponding problems for the time unit: in many cases it will probably have to be century, in other cases the limits between one unit and the next may be located in some other manner, e.g. "periods".

However, it is strongly felt that in the first run this is just a question of getting hold of as much trend data as possible, without asking too many questions about comparability. Also, it should be emphasized that trend data can be made use of ever if the precision is very low. Thus, a major classification to start with would simply be into three: monotone trends, non-monotone trends, and non-trends. Much should be done to arrive at some basis under which the non-trend, the constant factor could be located (the most obvious one being all the geographical parameters that remained constant during the last thousands of years).

Second, as to the data on events: the idea in the first run is to establish a good library of historical "atlases", and of books that have collected certain types of events and try to analyze them statistically over time (an example being Sorckin).

Most important here would be events that relate to expansion and contradiction of political domains. This should be put into a graphic form, and the best one I can imagine at the moment would be some type of "cartoon", some kind of movie which would permit one to see expansion and contradiction through time in such a way that the visual, almost physical perception of the phenomena will develop and hopefully lead to some new types of insight.

Of particular importance here would of course be data on incidents of direct violence, and quite a lot should be available in this field.

Third, there is the idea of collectiong theories. Particularly significant would be an effort to look at trends in the formation of theories about trends, also in order better to understand our own undertaking. Again the idea would be to be very tolerant and flexible to start with, permitting and looking for almost any theory with long trend perspective, although a focus will be on Marx and Weber, Sorokin and Toynbee.

Fourth, there is the idea of getting insight from historians, simply asking them to share whatever view they might have developed with us. This can be done through questionnaires later in the study, to start with through interviews. One can do so with selected historians, and with institutes of history in Europe, or all over the world for that matter.

Fifth, there is the use of monographs to get "atmosphere" from different periods. No doubt the study will lead to particularly interesting questions that can only be solved, if at all, at a deeper level of investigation.

It is suggested to wait with methods 4 and 5 and start with method 1, 2 and 3 at the same time. The reason for postponing method 4 is to have something to ask about before historians are approached, and also not to be dominated by their views. The reason to wait with no. 5 is similar, but more particularly to stay away from the temptation of the specialized monograph. Thus, the idea would be to start with trend data, some ideas about event data and the collection of theories. Where the latter is concerned it would be particularly useful if one could find non-European authors pronouncing themselves on Western civilization.

### 3. On theory fragments for the project

In my own research there are some theories and perspectives on which I would like to build, not in a dogmatic manner, only to see how far they carry in terms of interpretation. They are as follows:

(1) The theory of imperialism. I am thinking here of all the work done characterizing imperialism as a structure, between such collectivities as nations, based on vertical division on labor, on penetration and fragmentation.[1] The clear imperialist structure seems often to be present in Western history, and a major task here would be to develop a diachronic model that at least to some extent mirrors some basic feature of Western imperialism. In doing so the idea of "division of labor" will probably have to be sharpened considerably, and so would the idea of penetration. This is also a reason why it may be a good idea to start with the Roman Empire, with some antecedents, as a configuration in space and time that also has modelled European formations later.

(2) The work on contemporary Europe. This work is divided into two parts, the work on Western Europe, particularly the European Community[2] with an effort to see it as a replication of an old European configuration, and the work on all-European relations.[3] Throughout the latter the East-West distinction is seen as an old one, not in any sense as something originating after 1945, and the Eastern anxieties as very well justified in light of their historical experience. Thus, one line of thinking in connection with this project would be to trace the forerunners of the present European Community as well as the present West-West conflict down into European history.

(3) The work on revolution, within and between nations. The theory is here based on ideas of rank disequilibrium and related concepts, such as rank incongruence, rank disconcordance, and so on.[4] In another version a more complete set of factors facilitating a revolution, indicating its "objective conditions", is given.[5] The task would be to try to trace these factors in connection with major and relatively quick changes of structure in Europe, within as well as between, to see to what extent they are useful in identifying important elements.

(4) Theories of peace. The basic idea in the theories of peace developed is the combination of interdependence with equity.[6] It is quite possible that this idea is essentially a balance idea, an extrapolation from balance of power into other types of power. As such it may have short-comings, but it may also be useful if the focus is on trying to explain peace rather than war in European history - and this will be a focus. As a matter of fact, although the long-term trends probably look very bad an effort might be made nevertheless to show that if one looks at the total system at a given moment of time peace in the traditional sense rather than war has been prevalent.

(5) <u>Theories of conflict</u>. Many theories are developed here, for conflict of goals as well as for conflict of interest.[7] Identification of major conflicts as well as patterns of resolution would be extremely important as a contribution to the theory of conflict. Efforts will be made to use the spectrum of conflict resolution in this connection.

(6) <u>Theories of development</u>, are numerous indeed. Efforts will be made to combine theories that emphasize continuity, for instance accumulation, trends, etc. and theories that emphasize discontinuity. As to the former much thinking on accumulation of various kinds already exists, and as to the latter there is the fundamental marxist scheme. Efforts will be made to make use of two models developed: the idea of the relative domain of the geo-political system and the socio-economic system, leading to concepts of "primitive", "traditional", "modern", and "neo-modern" societies [8] - as well as the Models I, Il, III, IV sequence.[9]

(7) As to the cultural aspect of the trend study a <u>cultural typology</u> is needed. Some of the work done contrasting liberalism/marxism with gandhism/maoism to try to capture something that is seen as basic in Western/Christian relative to Asian/Buddist thinking may be made use of.[10] Efforts will also be made to engage in some explorations as to the relationship between ·structure and culture, assuming no dogmatic stand in this issue.

(8) As to the methodology the scheme of <u>bivariate diachronic analysis</u>[11] will be tried to some extent, using as a basis the experiences made in Japan study[12], and in the study of the relationship between educational and developmental indicators in general.[13]


In conclusion let me repeat that nothing can be guaranteed as to the results. It is rather certain that it will have to lead to some kind of increased understanding of the relations between history and other social sciences. Above all it is an effort, an experiment in looking at history in a new way, as a source of social science data - possibly also leading to a new way of looking at social science data, and at our own present and immediate future.

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## ON SCIENCE, MAN-NATURE AND MAN-MAN RELATIONS

How does nature have to be in order for man to make natural science? We shall assume in the following that a (simplistic) answer to this fundamental question is as follows: Nature has to be so as to follow natural laws, and a natural law states an invariance, a functional relation that holds regardless of variation in

a. space - space-homogeneity is assumed;
b. time - time-homogeneity is assumed;
c. subject - inter-subjective communicability and reproducibility of the invariance is assumed;
d. object - the meaning of which will be specified below.

Today all these four are taken for granted, and no sense of surprise is felt at the remarkable richness of "invariances" that seem to satisfy the first three requirements. In other words, very much of nature seems to be structured in such a way that findings are replicated from one point in space or one point in time to the other, and from one researcher to the next. But a closer look at this may bring out the obvious: this homogeneity is brought about by means of manipulation in the world of objects, without which the homogeneity would not have been obtained.

Of course, no changes took place in the objects themselves, but considerable changes must have taken place in man's relation to the objects, the units of his evolving science. If one follows the tradition of referring to some of these changes as abstraction, as the search for ever simpler, ever more "essential" objects, this covers some of it and leads the attention in the direction of friction-free surfaces and tallies, resistance-free gases and liquids, perfect gases and so on. Whether the old distinction between essential and accidental elements was indispensable for this type of abstraction is perhaps impossible to say; it must at any rate have been very useful in guiding the thought away from the

bewildering variety of external manifestation and in legitimising this travesty of nature, this plucking of feathers of all birds so as to make them look exactly similar and unproblematic - if no longer like birds,

But at the same time as natural objects became like simplified caricatures, deprived of all local color and variation that also might challenge homogeneity hypotheses, at the same time as generations of scientists, teachers, students and pupils learned to accept that this geometrized nature was more real than nature itself, at the same time as this external skinning of nature took place, nature was also eroded from within. She was deprived of her soul, her consciousness, she was pushed across the subject-object borderline so as to end up where man was not.

Thus, this extremely significant man-nature asymmetry had two aspects.

On the one hand individual apparitions of nature were deprived of their individuality, and the process of abstraction took place endowing nature only with those characteristics that fitted into "laws". But man was not treated this way: here a process of individuation took place, emphasizing how each apparition of mankind was different from the other, making individual dissimilarity a cornerstone in human thought and social structure.

Then, the corresponding process in the perceived interior of nature and man: nature as de-souled, man as be-souled. Perhaps one way of expressing it might be as follows. One could imagine a view of the world, a cosmology whereby soul is fairly evenly distributed between nature and man. Both are subjects. One could then imagine two processes setting in where the distribution of soul is concerned: on the one hand an asymmetric distribution ending up with zero percent to nature and hundred percent to man, on the other hand an individualization of the soul endowing each human being with his own individual soul, the salvation of which is independent of what happens to the souls of other human beings. The asymmetric distribution gives no hope for nature: nature will remain dead and inert, only man can attain higher levels through salvation. And then, through the decoupling of individual souls from each other a correspondence is obtained between the emphasis on individual dissimilarity and the separateness of the trajectories of individual souls. From man

no hope is taken, but he is increasingly seer as the individual
master of his own salvation.

In retrospect two implications of this type of soul-distribution
stand out very clearly: a social structure based on more or less
modified versions of <u>social darwinism</u> (the mobility of the fittest
in individual competition), and a <u>Herrschaft</u> relation to nature.
That these are both highly compatible with capitalist entrepreneurship
and exploitation of man as well of nature is more than obvious.
From isomorphism, however, does not follow causal relation       in
either direction.   The processes alluded to above took place long
before anything like modern capitalism entered the scene, but not
before some earlier forms of capitalism came into existence.   More
significant would be the changes man-nature as well as man-man
relations underwent in connection with industrialization,  particu-
larly with industrialization that took place in a capitalist society.
To develop that theme let us try for a moment to relate what has been
said so far to the model I-II-III-IV societies.

These models are nature-blind; they combine some basic feature
of structure and culture as far as interaction is concerned.   What
can be said is only that a <u>symmetric</u> man-nature relationship in
the double sense discussed above, as well as a low emphasis on
separateness of human souls, are both highly compatible with model I
society.   In a society of this type stability in social configuration
as well as in the ecology may be the rule, and <u>Partnershaft</u> rather
than <u>Herrschaft</u> relative to nature would not contradict this.   On
the other hand there is also the Japanese experience whereby what is
essentially a model I society shows its extreme mastery of nature.
It may be objected that in the Japanese case depletion of resources
takes place outside since Japanese industry is based on import,
Japan herself being very poor in natural resources.   But a society
with sincere respect for nature, with a really symmetric <u>Partnershaft</u>,
would not have polluted nature as much as Japan has done.

Similarly, it is also easily seen that there is compatibility
between the <u>asymmetric</u> man-nature view and the abstraction from nature
as well as the individuation of man, with model II society.   And in
model II society this, then, laid the basis for two <u>modes</u> of
behavior, two paradigms of human relation to the environment:   one
relative to man, referred to as <u>interaction</u>, and one relative to
nature, referred to as <u>action</u>.

Jürgen Habermas has summarized these two paradigms brilliantly in his "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'" (from Toward a Rational Society, Heinemann, London, 1971, p. 93):

|  | Symbolic interaction | Purposive-rational action |
|---|---|---|
| action-orienting rules | social norms | technical rules |
| type of definition | reciprocal expecta-tions about behavior | conditional predictions conditional imperatives |
| mechanisms of acquisition | role internalization | learning of skills and qualifications |
| sanctions against violations of rules | punishment on the basis of conventio-nal sanctions: failure against autority | inefficacy: failure in reality |

(Habermas also mentions some other dimensions.)

Very often the same behavior may have both aspects: somebody using a spade may use it wrongly (not according to the instructions from some authority) or incorrectly (not according to technical rules).

Let us now assume that in an extremely asymmetric cosmology where relation to man and relation to nature are concerned the interaction paradigm would dominate the former and the action paradigm the latter. But the two realms are not that dichotomous. Man has an obvious interface with nature: his body. And many aspects of nature have so far escaped successfully attempts to express them in the form of a law, at the same time as nature still is capable of not only hitting (a hurricane, a tsunami) but of hitting back (natural disasters caused, at least partially, by depletion and pollution) that nature can at least to some extent be conceived of as a strategic actor, in other words as engaged in interaction. But whereas this in principle might give rise to either of two processses, an extension of the interaction paradigm to be valid for relations with nature, or an extension of the action paradigm to be valid for relations with man, only the latter has happened.

This prevalence of the action paradigm into human affairs has been an obvious target of the social criticism of the last decade. What seems to be the case is that what one could call the Christian-scientific onslaught on nature, and elevation of man, creating the

extreme asymmetry referred to does not lead to  a stable cosmology.
For instance, medical science, which in principle is located exactly
at the interface referred to above, becomes naturalistic, abstracting
from the individuality of man to an objective pathology which is
disease-centered rather than individual-centered, and when "soul"
enters it is in the form of psycho-somatic medicine where the same
natural science-orientation  may also have invaded "that which is
left in man when soma is subtracted".

In the social sciences the abstraction takes the form of
fragmentation:  man is chopped up in a number of characteristics and
is recorded as a set of data on verbal (interview, questionnaire)
or non-verbal behavior.  This is then taken over by private and
governmental bureaucracies, in data banks on employees or citizens.

Most of the critique has been directed against this type of
reification  of man in economic life.  Obviously, this is related
to the view of man that sees labor as a "production factor", on line
with capital and land, and the capitalist mode of production in which
all production factors are optimally mobile.  Just as capital and
land are given their abstract representation, so is man in the form
of labor:  he enters economic equations (whether set up by firms, by
bureaucracies, or by economists in their research) in the form of
labor, as producer, and also as consumer, as market.  Homo oeconomicus
operates in an economic system much like the bodies in newtonian
mechanics, as a perfect abstraction.  He becomes an object of the
action paradigm  when he is manipulated, i.e. when social space
is equipped, deliberately, with gradients (social, economic) so as
to make man the producer, and man the consumer, flow in certain
directions rather than others, seek this labor rather than that labor
and buy this product rather than that one.  Critics have pointed out
that there is no essential difference between this and equipping
physical space with gradients (simply using the law of gravity), as
for instance when "land" (raw materials) is moved from one place to
another.  The basic point is always the same:  man is seen as obeying
laws that are space, time and subject invariant, and this is
obtained  1. by abstraction,  2. by "de-souling", which here shall
be expressed in terms less filled with religious overtones:  he is
seen as without consciousness.  Since he is without consciousness he
cannot raise above the law in which he is embedded.  And to be quite
sure that he will not, a strongly vertical division between researchers

and people is introduced with     researchers formulating laws about
people, not vice versa, and never investigating what happens to
people who are cognizant of the laws, have developed sufficient con-
sciousness not only to understand them but also to get glimpses of
their alternatives, and hence are able to raise above them.

In the <u>military</u> sphere this type of   reification of man takes
its extreme   form in connection with modern strategic thinking and
modern means of destruction.   Strategic equations are presented,
in mathematical form or in ordinary language, where human beings
are reduced to increments of unacceptability; they are alive or
dead, and when they are dead they may push the number of dead bodies
(counted in "mega-body" or something similar as a unit) across a
hypothetical limit of unacceptability.   The correspondence between
this totally alienated way of thinking about other human beings and
the way in which it is enacted in remote control, technified, even
automated warfare is too obvious to be pointed out.

However, there is one point that should be made.   To modern
military man not all other human beings are abstractions more or
less without consciousness, material to be manipulated even to the
point of death so as to change some parameter  in strategic equations.
This view would mainly apply to the "population" on either side,
one's own as well as the other's who would enter as hostages in the
equations.   It would not apply to the "leaders" on either side.
They are equipped with a high level of individuality.   There is as
much emphasis on the personaly biography of each leader on either
side as there is on broad, highly abstract social science
descriptions of the populations, for instance to determine where the
unacceptability line should be drawn.   The leaders on the other side
are also equipped with the same level of consciousness as one
attrubites to oneself,   often through a process of ethocentric
projection that will attribute to them not only the same level, but
also identical consciousness (which may often be a correct perception
since the two will obviously shape each other).   So, the result is
that a borderline runs not so much between the two parties, the
"enemies" as between the leaders to which interaction applies on the
one hand and the "people" on the other hand, to which action, including
extermination, may apply.

Thus, the cooperation between two leaderships in setting up
an armistice agreement (even referred to as "peace"), an arms control
agreement (even referred to as "disarmament"), in no sense removes
the borderline between leaders and peoples.  The situation is
parallel to the situation found between two governments or the
boards of two big corporations when they enter into an agreement
about mobility of labor.  From above the particles in the masses
have no individuality; one dead body is substitutable for the other
at the same level of replaceability in society, just as one worker
is substitutable for the other at the same skill level.  Substitu-
tability is the general formula here:  through the process of
abstraction and de-souling the most complex apparition of nature,
including man, can be characterized in terms of a limited, even low
number of variables and classes of equivalent pieces within which
substitutability is possible can be clearly defined.  Needless to say,
in the general field of production education is the major sorting
mechanism through which substitutability classes are generated.

Thus, the action paradigm has been successful, man has
increasingly been regarded as nature and nature has increasingly been
regarded as    that which fits natural laws in the way defined above.
One may now ask two questions:  can this process go any further?
and, can the process be reversed?

As to the first question there is no doubt that it can go much
further.  In his essay Habermas makes the point that "socience and
technology were  not interdependent until  late into the nineteenth
century" (op.cit., p. 99).  Of course, technologies have always
existed, but their autonomous growth and change in the last century
derives from their intimate link  with science, and this has then
had a spill-over effect of creating "social engineering" and "human
technology".  But not everybody in society is equally absorbed in
this system.  The most "modern" sectors are, and they constitute
bonds between what was formerly referred to as capitalists and
workers, making them similar to each other and similar to the machines
of various kinds that formed the third corner in the techno-structure.

But society still have zones and segments outside the techno-
structure, such as autonomous parts of the primary sector, family
life, friendship ties, and so on.  The characteristic theme of
dystopias in our century, whether by Huxley, Boye,  Orwell, Čapek
is precisely the invasion by the action paradigm into these spheres

as well, and the final absorption of the social totality into the
techno-structure. And the basic point about populist thinking as
opposed to marxist thinking is perhaps precisely that the decisive
borderline is seen between the techno-structure and the rest (the
local community, the primary sector, etc.), not within the techno-
structure. But needless to say, these two perspectives do not
exclude each other.

What about the second question, whether the process can be
reversed? A reversal of the process could take two forms: a re-
introduction of the extreme asymmetry between man-man and man-nature
relations, adapting the Christian view that man has a dignity which
nature has not. But it could also take a much more radical form,
restoring dignity, so to speak, both to man and to nature. Since
one of our arguments has been that the extreme asymmetry does not
seem to constitute a stable cosmology stability may only be available
in symmetric cosmologies, with complete objectification (Orwell's
1984) on the one end, and complete subjectification (in Western
thought often disparagingly referred to as "animatism") on the other
end. Seen from the view that man is the master of nature and stands
somewhere between God and nature, but closer to the former, both
extremes must appear as primitivisms, one as a menace in the future,
the other as a shadow from the past. Since the technification may
be said to have gone further in Protestant and in Catholic countries
within Christianity it is not strange that they have different views
on birth control: Protestant churches by and large accepting
mechanical and chemical means, the Catholic church rejecting them
exactly for that reason, the technification of man.

ON TIME

     History unfolds itself in a medium referred to as time,
and no reasoning about history can refuse to take the notion of
time seriously. In doing so one immediately gets into problems
since our entire thinking about time seems to be so structured by
the idea of public, physical, chronological time found all around
us in the shape of watches and clocks, calendars and diaries,
newspapers and chronicles of any kind. Characteristically, this
concept of time is public in the sense of being shared, it is uni-
dimensional and it flows evenly, and we with it, in a uni-directional
manner. It is this highly simplistic concept of time that one
might want to challenge.

     One way of doing this would be to contrast time with its
conceptual twin, space. As commonly conceived of space is three-
dimensional and euclidean, and is also endowed with a simple
metric. It differs in very important ways from time. Thus, having
more dimensions it       offers more latitude. Moreover, there is
no assumption of uni-directionality: time has an arrow, space does
not. In space one can move up and down, back and forth, to the
right and to the left - in time one is moved, in one direction.

     More significantly, however, is the idea of contemporality,
the idea that we all right now share the same point in time.
There is no corresponding notion about space, that we right now
share the same point in space - which might have been referred to
as the idea of "conspatiality". But imagine there was such an idea,
that space was structured more like time. In that case we would
all be located within a narrow point in space and all move at an
even pace together, uni-directionally in a space that would have
been restricted to one-dimensionality. In that case space would
be like time as conceived of, and           would probably
no longer be referred to as space - but for instance as time!
However, the metaphor is still useful in order to point out one
basic circumstance: in our usual way of structuring these basic
categories we give to ourselves an enormous freedom in space and
we make ourselves slaves of time. It is this type of notion that
we want to challenge.

     Before doing so it should be noted that the theory of rela-
tivity changes what has been said above. Time and space become
more similar, the difference between them washes out in the notion
of a four-dimensional time-space continuum equiped with a curvature
where even the infinity usually attributed today (but certainly
not in earlier ages!) to time and space disappears. But the
concept of the theory of relativity has not penetrated into the
general ways of thinking about these matters; it is still reserved
for a very special group of people. In fact, it may be doubted
whether it has at all had that revolutionary impact on our notions
of space and time predicted by earlier generations in this century.

Hence, we shall start from much more simple concepts that seem to make more sense in the daily lives of people in general. And the basic idea here could be taken from topology: the idea of a neighborhood. It is assumed that everybody is part of a neighborhood that includes him or herself, and is capable of perceiving whether that neighborhood remains constant or changes. Let us then simply say the following: let us say that if the person is stationary (there is no movement out of the neighborhood), and the neighborhood remains constant, then time is also constant. And correspondingly: if the neighborhood is changing then time is also changing. In other words, we proceed from the very simple assumption that phenomena do not change as a function of time, it is time that is defined as a function of changing phenomena. Only where there is change is there time. Where there is no change time has to be artificially brought in, for instance in the form of a watch to remind us of an abstract public time flowing somewhere in general.

Our language makes ample reference to this type of time concept. Thus, one often talks about places where it looks as if "time is standing still" - meaning places where little or no change is taking place. Under other occasions we say that "time was moving extremely quickly", meaning that changes came and took place very rapidly. In both cases it is quite clear that something else constitutes time, which is also clearly brought out in our time measuring devices. In an hour glass sand is running, presumably at a constant speed meaning that equal amounts of sand correspond to equal amounts of time. There is change in the level of sand, and when all has gone through the hour glass filled at the bottom may serve as a symbol of time standing still.

More basic, however, are other types of changes that take place in one neighborhood, and here the obvious reference is to the human organism and the parts of nature included in the neighborhood. Let us now look at the concept of change and simply define it as follows: the neighborhood undergoes a succession of states, $S_1, S_2 ... S_n$.     One of two things can happen: either $S$ enters in as a new state not found earlier in the series $S_1$-$S_n$, or it is a recurrence of an earlier state. In other words, we assume that there is some kind of way in which states may be identified as similar enough to be classified as the same, and different enough to be classified as dissimilar. If the new states are really new in the sense that they have never occured before then we shall refer to the change as linear, although this word is not very fortunate since it also connotes a metric and a particular functional relation. And if the states have recurrent elements then there are many possibilities out of which the simplest one is the pattern referred to as cyclical: the same set of states recurs in the same order. Obviously, for this to happen there has to be a minimum of two different states, for instance two seasons, day and night, and so on. Much more complex patterns can be imagined if there is recurrence. The type of periodicity, if any, may have any level of complexity, but we assume that linear change and cyclical change as defined here are the most important, basic components.

In the science of mechanics they correspond to <u>translation</u>
and <u>rotation</u> respectively. Any movement can be analyzed for these
two components, just as any set of successive states can be analyzed
correspondingly. What would happen if the world of mechanics could
only offer examples of translation, and our world of changing states
only linearity? In the first case things would go apart, or move
along and along; they would not come back again     the way rotation
guarantees. And in the second case one would have to assume that
the world had an infinitely rich repetory of states, never repeating
itself. Cyclical time concepts is a concession to the world,
saying that the world does not need an infinite repetory, even a
small repetory can do and there can still be many changes. As a
matter of fact such notions immediately bring to one's mind
different types of personalities: persons who always have to
experience something new, and others who are quite content with
the reappearance of old patterns. Youth and old age respectively?

In the most important time piece today, the watch, what is
in principal linear is in fact measured cyclically. The pointers
move around and around in the same cycle, pointing to new states
all the time, till they start doing it over again. Of course,
implicitly one has then entered a new twelve hours phase, which
may or may not be indicated in a calendar window; but the moves
taken are cyclical rather than linear. They correspond to the
changing seasons of the year or the changing positions of the
globe during the year, not to mention the globe's rotation around
its own axis during 24 hours rather than to the linear changes
that take place in a human body as it grows older and older.

We assume everybody to be surrounded by linear and cyclical
patterns of change, and also to combine them in various ways.
The most obvious way of combining them is possibly the <u>spiral</u> with
one forward thrust combined with a cyclical movement. Probably,
many people conceive of time that way, feeling that they move
around the cycle during one year at the same time as they move
forward with the years. Looking down the spiral at fall time one
may perceive other autumns, vaguely disappearing into the mist of
forgetfulness, but it is probably generally true that one more
easily sees the same season in earlier years than other seasons.
In other words, time may be particularly transparent vertically,
down the spiral.

The most important consequence of this type of reasoning is
to challenge the two principles of contemporality and uni-direction-
ality of time.

According to what has been said the only meaning of <u>contem-
porality</u> would be to be in the same neighborhood. A person who
lives at the place where "time is standing still" also lives in
contemporality with himself time and time ago, regardless of what
kind of flow physical time may have registered in the same period.
He is also contemporaneous with others who live in the same type
of neighborhood, regardless of where and when as measured by
standard physical concepts. It may be objected that they both
undergo change due to aging, but if this change is not perceived
(which it ordinarily is not for reasonable physical time intervals)

then we can still talk about time as standing still.

But one consequence of this is the idea of <u>private time</u>, the idea that everybody has his own time, depending on what happens in his or her neighborhood. Remove ordinary physical time and this is much more easily seen. It may make excellent sense to say that one person can be at the same place as another, in other words, they have "conspatiality", and yet one takes the time to the left, the other the time to the right. They live in the same neighborhood but since these neighborhoods are subjective rather than objective they perceive them completely differently. One person may see that which is constant, so he is standing still in time. Another person may see a cyclical pattern, so he is walking in a circle in time. And a third person may be sensitive to every new state or aspect of states brought into the neighborhood: clearly, he is moving along a linear time path. Hence, just as much as one can talk about persons having contemporality, yet taking different paths in space we must talk about persons having conspatiality, yet taking different paths in time. It is only because the whole notion of private time has been lost, or rather destroyed through the superimposition of public, physical, chronological time that such ideas do not flourish in our minds.

But in the language they nevertheless somehow survive. One talks about persons as being behind or ahead of "their time" - probably referring by the latter expression to some sort of public average or powerholder definition of which date is salient and hence defining "our time". A person who is "living in his own world" is probably off on his own private time path, whatever structure it may have (a constant spot, a cycle, a line, a spiral and so on).

And correspondingly with <u>uni-directionality</u>. For a person who is standing still in time there is no direction one way or the other. A person with a purely cyclical time concept has a direction, but only if there are more than two phases or states - with only two states it is impossible to say whether he goes forwards or backwards, whether day comes before night or vice-versa. At any rate he can be compared to a person who walks around in a room in a circle, passing through the same regions in the same order. In other words, uni-directionality holds only under special conditions when it comes to what is defined as changing states.

Why do we find, nevertheless, that private time has capitulated to public time?

One hypothesis could be that <u>certain linear phenomena are seen as being much more salient, prevalent than certain cyclical phenomena.</u> Since one important group of cyclical phenomena has to do with nature, and more particularly, with agriculture when translated into human action terms, then one might assume that cyclical time concepts would diminish in significance with the decline of agriculture as a predominant form of economic activity. Industry does not know the same kind of rhythms, although there are business cycles in capitalistic societies that might serve to

structure and define time. In general, however, accumulation, usually referred to as "economic growth", seems to be a more salient characteristic and that should give rise to notions of linear time.

Linear time, however, does not necessarily have to be public, so that aspect would have to be explained in terms of other circumstances, such as increasing interaction and interdependence. It takes no great reflection to understand that in a world populated by small nomadic communities of the order of magnitude $10^2$, isolated from each other, a generally shared public time would be considerably less meaningful than in a highly interwoven, interdependent world like the world found today at the elite level. Interaction inevitably leads to notions of predictability, and predictability is probably enhanced by having a common time reference. Thus, public time emerges, and it is a telling sign of the salience of western imperialism that the dominant time of the world is the time of the dominant class: the Christian calendar for macro time, western science and technology crystallized into time measuring instruments for micro time. Countries with a high element of Islamic penetration differ by subtracting a constant, and Japan differs by having much shorter "eras", corresponding to the reigns of the various emperors (the present era is Showa, which started in 1926 with the advent of Emperor Hirohito to the throne). Incidentally, Japan also has cyclical time based on periods of 12 years, each year being given the name of an animal, and the 12 animals recurring in the same order. The assumption is that people of the same animal are contemporaries in a sense not acceptable to western chronological time.

It was mentioned above that this refers to elite time concepts in the world, underneath all of this no doubt private times flourish at the community and the individual level. No doubt the time structure of the world is considerably richer than the trivialization brought about by trying to press all time cosmologies into the narrow structure of uni-dimensional, uni-directional flow so well known to us. Probably this is one of the most important ways of homogenizing the world ever found, possibly much more important than participation in the same production structure or adherence to the same fundamental ideology. The idea that we share a slot in time however different our neighborhoods is counter-intuitive, abstract, highly vertical because it is much more meaningful to some people than to others: yet, remarkably persistent and ubiquitous.

# ON PERIODS IN HISTORY

Let us proceed from the assumption that time is a function of changing phenomena, not vice-versa. Historical time, hence, should probably be a function of changing social phenomena if we assume that our concern is with the history of societies, and not for instance with the history of climate, the history of the animal kingdom, of geology, and so on. If history is the study of societies over time much as comparative sociology, for instance, studies them in space the question of classification arises. Any sociologist would have his classificatory scheme of society, and he would, more or less successfully, follow the rule for classification: there should be as much homogeneity within the class as possible, and as much heterogeneity between the classes as possible.

Historians compare a society with itself over time. A comparison necessarily involves looking for that which remains constant and that which differs. In doing so historians will necessarily have to divide time, and a period in history seems to be the same as a class for sociology. Periods should exhibit a certain internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity in order to be fruitful. In other words, the same criteria for fruitful division should be applicable.

In practice, however, there is a problem here of some significance. Thus, periods relate to each other in a way classes do not: they relate to each other causally. If a fruitful division of time into periods has been undertaken then there is always the danger that such periods are seen as water-tight compartments. In other words, there will be a built-in neglect to the extent in which the latter period was already present in the former, as a seed, even blossoming, and the extent to which the former period has survived into the latter. Unclean classification is also the problem of any taxonomy, but there it shows up merely as lower correlations than one might like to have. For historical research it has more profound implications, for if a clear-cut periodization is believed in then history will probably be seen as more discontinuous than it is. In other words, any theory that divides history according to periods or phases will also have a tendency to be a theory reinforcing thinking about abrupt social transitions from one phase to the other, eg. revolutions. An emphasis on continuous patterns of change, evolution, will always challenge any division into neat periods with thought-evoking names.

Nevertheless, periodization does take place, it is a prevalent phenomenon in the writing of history and thereby shapes our time cosmology. One might therefore also try to say something about criteria according to which periodization should or could

take place.

One such criterion would be to try to proceed graphically/
mathematically by plotting basic variables against chronological
time, and then inferring the periods from the shape of the curve.
Using the variables in the appended sheet, plotting them against
time, it looks as if the curves are all bending upwards during the
last centuries, after a long period of relative constancy. Taking
such curves seriously would mean a division of world history into
two periods, Period I and Period II, with the latter starting more
or less with the Industrial Revolution that in turn brought with
it all the other changes of importance, differentiating between
a first period of relative stability and a second period of
relative change in all these variables.

This dichotomy in a "before and after", using the Industrial
Revolution rather than the Birth of Christ as the watershed, can
then be refined through a further subdivision of either period,
as indicated. Doing this one ends up with four periods of history:
with the group, clan or tribe; the city-state with a city nucleus
surrounded by villages; the nation-state with a capital nucleus
surrounded by cities surrounded by villages; and the world state
divided into regions as the typical configurations. It is with
the advent of the latter that world history may be said to start.

One major objection to this type of approach to the problem
of periodicity has to do with the nature of the variables used.
No doubt these variables refer to important aspects of society,
but none of these variables reflects social structure. They are
all similar in their lack of structure orientation. They can be
used to characterize what a society has, and to some extent even
what individuals have or may have; they don't tell us anything
about structural relations inside society.

One scheme that purports to say something in this connection
can be constructed using two structural dichotomies: verticality
vs. horizontality, and uniformity vs. diversity. Combining them
gives rise to 4 different social formations that may be referred
to as Conservative, Liberal, Communal and Pluralist social forms
respectively:

|  | Uniformity | Diversity |
|---|---|---|
| Verticality | Model I: Conservative | Model II: Liberal |
| Horizontality | Model III: Communal | Model IV: Pluralist |

This could also be seen as a set of successive periods, and as a generalization of the scheme attributed to Engels: feudal/capitalist/socialist/communist. It would be a generalization in the sense that social formations are defined in terms that may comprise but also go beyond the structure of economic production.

This effort has the advantage that it deals more symmetrically with the past and the future since Model I belongs clearly to the past in most parts of the world and Model IV clearly to the future, at the same time as Model II is a dominant form since it is dominant in the dominant part of the world (the west), and Model III may be said to be an emerging form (particularly in China). To the extent that it deals with the past the transition from Model I to Model II is put further back in time (roughly to the period between the Renaissance and the French Revolution), and not like the dichotomy of time originally referred to where the Industrial Revolution would carry the watershed burden and define the second period as a very short one.

Thus, there are two suggestions for division of historical time into four periods with the understanding that these periods are analytical rather than empirical categories. Thus, a given society at a given point in time may have within its conventionally defined confines, the political borders, elements of all four types from both schemes. If it so does then that would mean that different segments of society exist in different periods in history, in other words that it becomes not very meaningful to talk as if public, chronological time were the only time concept.

One could also combine the two schemes in another way, for instance by talking about traditional and modern segments within a liberal (capitalist) society, or about conservative and liberal structures coexisting within a modern society. In fact, this would give rise to 16 different combinations, none of which should be ruled out completely a priori. Japan, for instance, is a good example of the possibility of combining feudal structure with neo-modern social form, in the particular way that perhaps no other society would easily be able to imitate.

Table 1. *Stages of socio-economic development*

| Term for the stage | Primitive (P) | Traditional (T) | | Modern (M) | | Neomodern (N) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Primary Tertiary | | Sec-<br>Pri- on- Terti-<br>mary dary ary | Tertiary |
| | | | | | | Post-tertiary education |
| | | | | High | | Tertiary education |
| | Primary | High | | Middle | | Secondary education |
| | | Low | | Low | | Primary education |
| Term for the transition | Urban revolution | | Industrial revolution | | Automation revolution | |
| **Population profiles** | | | | | | |
| primary sector | 100   90 | 80 | 75 | 50 | 20 | 5   0 |
| secondary sector | 0   5 | 5 | 10 | 20 | 30 | 5   0 |
| tertiary sector | 0   5 | 15 | 15 | 30 | 50 | 90   100 |
| Agricultural productivity | 1 : 1<br>and less | 1 : 1.25 | 1 : 1.33 | 1 : 2 | 1 : 5 | 1 : 20<br>and higher |
| GNP/capita | up to $ 50 | $ 50–$ 600 | | $ 600–$ 4,000 | | $ 4,000 and above |
| **Communication**<br>goods, persons | walking, running<br>rowing | animals, wheels<br>sailing | | steam engine<br>combustion engine | | jet rockets |
| information | eye and ear | dispatches | | post, telegraph,<br>telephone | | tele-satellite |
| Economic system | subsistence economy | barter economy | | money economy | | credit economy |
| Domain | group, clan, tribe | village, city-state | | nation-state | | region, world-state |
| Magnitude | $10^0$–$10^2$ | $10^2$–$10^5$ | | $10^5$–$10^8$ | | $10^8$–$10^{10}$ |

From: <u>Mankind 2000</u>, page 16.

# ON THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

Since the Idea of Progress has to do with time it cannot be discussed without some notion of time cosmology. More particularly, it looks as if the idea can be split into two components, one is the idea of time linearity, the other is the idea of amelioration. Thus, one can obviously have linearity without amelioration - that the world, or rather the immediate neighborhood enters always a new state does not in and by itself say anything about the direction in which the quality of the state changes. It may go up, which is the idea of amelioration, it may remain constant, it may go down, or any combination of these. Correspondingly, where there first is amelioration in a cycle, and then a new cycle of the same kind, then this means that between the two cycles there is some kind of apocalypse, the world suddenly goes from high to low. Similarly, one may also have deterioration within a cycle and then a repetition of the cycle, which means that the apocalypse has to be positive: a sudden transition from low to high, and then once more a process of deterioration which then may, perhaps, more properly be referred to as erosion. Incidentally, it is the pattern of amelioration followed by an apocalyptic rupture that one might use, perhaps, as a characteristic of westernness.

Here, however, the focus will be on the Idea of Progress itself, in other words on linearity combined with amelioration, and not on what happened before and after Progress became the dominant pattern. We shall then assume that this idea, or cosmological form, is partly abstracted from surrounding reality, and partly imposed upon it. This means that the discussion of the Idea of Progress can be divided into two parts: what are some of the external circumstances that might favor an Idea of Progress, and to what extent will the Idea of Progress, once it has been internalized at individual and collective levels (the latter meaning shared internalization) serve to shape external reality?

We shall start with the former, and as one point of departure try to single out some phenomena that would tend to favor a conceptualization of time as linear rather than cyclic.

## (1) Forms of production.

Any form of production that depends on the cycles of nature would tend to underline a cyclical notion of time, a form of production independent of nature would not do so. Thus, it is customary to say that agriculture is cyclical, industry is linear, for the former repeats itself over and over again whereas the latter just continues in a steady line of production. Farming in general, it may be asserted, is cyclical: this does not only apply to sowing and harvesting, but also to breeding and

slaughtering, an eternal cycle of birth, growth and death of plants and animals.

However, there is an assumption inherent here: that everything coming out of agriculture is consumed, whereas what comes out of industry is to some extent accumulated. But imagine that agriculture were different, as it is in some parts of the world, resulting in ever-increasing stocks of grain, etc., growing sky high and in and by their growth constituting a linear time concept. Conversely, imagine that industrial production takes place for satisfaction of needs only, not for a satisfaction of demand, and is discontinued when needs are satisfied only to be reopened when there is some unsatisfied need somewhere. In that case industry would not accumulate. It would even show cycles of activity and latency (rest), even though these cycles would not in general coincide with the cycles of nature. Something else coming out of industry might accumulate: pollution and depletion, the mountains of refuse close to the mines in Europe and America might still grow, also sky high, also constituting a linear concept of time. But if we imagine that industry were as wise in terms of preserving ecological balance as farming to a large extent has been then even that factor might be absent.

In short, the assumption here is that farming is for immediate consumption, industry for accumulation, and permitted to expand, which can only take place with expanding markets. These markets may be in space, as when the consumption area is expanded, or in time as when a former consumer is made to consume again. A capitalism based on ever expanding markets, particularly in the form of imperialism (in space) and planned obsolescence (in time), both of them combined with marketing mechanisms through which supply will stimulate demand and not only vice-versa (as the rationalist assumption would have it) would satisfy these conditions. And in that case it would be perfectly acceptable if agriculture also took on the same form, making the economic centers of the world also into net exporters of agricultural goods, in an ever changing pattern of fads and fashions.

On the other hand, an economy based on production for immediate consumption in a cyclical pattern, particularly a subsistence agricultural economy would certainly work contrary to any conception of linear time. Everybody would be surrounded by overwhelming evidence to the effect that Reality is cyclical, and the conceptualization of time would/might be accordingly.

(2) Modernization.

Under this nebulous heading one may group together a substantial bundle of variables including such things as urbanization, transportation, communication, institutions for health and welfare, educational institutions, all kinds of innovations and technologically produced and inspired hardware, and so on. Most of these variables (or all of them, if one uses this as a criterion) show a very rapid upward turn before, around and certainly after the Industrial Revolution, in Europe, that is.

For most or all of these variables the curve still shows an
upward slope, quantities are still growing, and as long as
this is the case it seems rather trivial that Ideas of Progress
will at least receive continuous linearity reinforcement from
any observation of the external world. Whether this idea
created the growth here referred to as "modernization" or
"modernization" created the idea is another matter, but the
linkage should be relatively clear. It is very often referred
to as the difference between static and dynamic societies,
even as traditional and modern (from which the present heading
has been taken) - and is for the sociologist what the form of
production is for the economist in efforts to analyze differences
and relations between more and less developed countries. It
should only be noted that the point here is not in terms of level
that these variables have attained, but the difference between
constant level (however low or high) and change, or moving level
(irrespective of from where).

(3)  Density in space and time.

There is one particular type of density that may be important
here: population density. A country that has very much space
also has a great possibility of expansion in a very simple, visible
and obvious sense: by settling in virgin territory, by "civilizing"
nature, by "making the desert bloom". As long as this expansion
process takes place notions of linearity can be read directly
off the map. An obvious example today would be Brazil where
everybody is following the progress of the roads into the Amazon,
as pointers along an axis of linear time.

If now the territory is completely settled so that there
are no more expansion possibilities within existing technology
and social formation, there are of course still possibilities
of change. But these changes might be more complicated, less
visible and less obvious. They would not have the immediacy of
conquered territory, unless they are in the relatively clear
categories referred to above.

An Idea of Progress, hence, should more easily develop in
a country that has experienced this type of expansion for some
time and, one may add, still have some distance to go. All
exponential curves tend on closer inspection out to be the
first half of a logistic curve, but whereas the saturation level
is hidden from us and only subject to theoretical explorations
for most of the variables referred to under (2) above, the
saturation level is very obvious when it comes to territory.
In this case the limits to growth would be less controversial,
although they can be transcended through military conquest or
imperialism.

Thus, the time factor also enters as indicated in the
heading. But it enters in a double way, not only as a question
of future perspective, but also in terms of past experiences.
What we have said above is essentially that a country short on
human geography will easily foster the idea of linearity of time;

what is added here is that a country short on human <u>history</u>
might do likewise.  To be short on history means to be a new
nation, like the United States and to a large extent also the
Soviet Union, if one emphasizes the Asian part of that country.
This does not necessarily mean that the territory was unpopulated
before, only that there is a discontinuity in history or that
the history of the original inhabitants is regarded as ahistorical
- in the same category as the history of, say, a termite society.
As a matter of fact, on closer examination this may exactly mean
that their history is regarded as cyclical and conditioned by
natural cycles only (including biological cycles inherent in Man).
Thus a zero point is defined, and whatever linear change there
has been during the last century or two will look much more
impressive relative to zero than relative to thousands of years
of civilization, lineal or cyclical.

## (4) The role of eschatology.

Eschatologies define states of being, particularly after
death, and with, usually, a very definite ordering in terms of
preference.  Paradise is better than this world, this world is
better than Hell, and so on.  If the soul finds as its dwelling
a part of nature, e.g. an animal, then the ordering of animals
is also an eschatological preference relation.  Thus, the basis
for an Idea of Progress seems to be an inherent part of eschato-
logies - unless there are good examples to the contrary, i.e.
eschatologies that define a set of states for the human afterlife,
all of them equally valued.

But this is only necessary, not a sufficient condition. If
it is to serve as something that might induce a conception of
linearity in time there has to be a process somewhere.  And it is
at this point that Christian and Hindu conceptions seem so utterly
different: in Christian eschatology reversibility does not seem
to occur, in Hindu eschatology it does.  In Christian eschatology
neither conversion nor salvation are reversible: enlightenment
once attained and paradise once entered cannot be lost.  In Hindu
eschatology movements up and down belong to the picture, although
there is also a stationary state from which no reversal is no
longer possible (<u>Nirvana</u>).

Although it might be clear that Christian eschatology is
linear it does not follow that Hindu eschatology is cyclical, only
that it is non-linear.  As already said, Man is not doomed to an
endless repetition of the same cycle, but he is not launched on
one uni-linear path based on his performance in this life either.
There are second, third, any number of chances; there are possi-
bilities of ups and downs in after-life as in this life.

Thus, in the four factors above we have phenomena that exist
in the external environment, that might serve not only to induce
notions of linearity, but also notions of amelioration - the latter
most clear in connection with eschatology.  But if an Idea of Progress
first has been internalized then any linear growth pattern will be

defined as progress, and that applies also to numbers (1),
(2) and (3) above. Industrialization will be progress,
capitalism in its spatial and temporal aspects will be progress,
modernization will be progress and expansion, even population
growth will be progress as long as there is expansion. As a
matter of fact, it would be rather strange if it were not this
way. People, a country, a civilization living in the type of
environment defined above will regard linearity and amelioration
as normal. Anything that does not happen according to this
pattern will be seen as deviant, abnormal, against a trend -
or defined away, or simply not perceived at all - themes to be
developed below.

And what about those who do not live in such neighborhoods?
People engaged in cyclically defined agriculture, not for the
exchange of commodities and accumulation but for self consumption;
people who live in a static man-made environment; people who
have exhausted the possibilities of territorial expansion and
who in addition have a fairly long history and, indeed, people
with a less linear eschatology - what about them? It seems that
they would live in a world where there would be no Idea of
Progress, but either an idea of basic stability, or an idea of
ups and downs, an Idea of Progress and Regress. To such people
the ups and downs of history would be more natural; neither of
them would have to be overlooked or defined away. This might
constitute a strength: in the down periods one is less taken
by surprise and more able to face it realistically because it
is seen as inherent in social and historical phenomena, and
thus less of a shock. On the other hand this may also be a
weakness: it may lead to a fatalism where what is natural is
exactly seen as natural in the same sense as an earthquake, a
volcanic explosion and no action is taken.

Let us now use this to look more into how people living
under the spell of an Idea of Progress can handle all the obvious
cases to the contrary. There are many of them, and there are
different mechanisms that can be operative.

## (1) The problem of aging and death.

For instance, what to do about the rather obvious fact that
people do not progress linearly physically and mentally, and
deteriorate? The solution is in a sense very simple: decreased
visibility of either phenomenon. And this is done partly by
segregating old people, taking them out of ordinary social life
through retirement schemes when they reach a certain age, taking
them out of regular family life and putting them in old age
homes when they are no longer able to take care of themselves,
putting them in special compartments in hospitals when they
are about to die, and finally burying them in well-hidden
cemeteries, far enough away from general social intercourse.
Similar things are done to the physically and mentally deviant:
they are also segretated and placed away from the social eyes,
so to speak, so that the social consciousness does not have to
integrate them in any theory of society and history.

Compare this to the opposite: a society where everybody lives together, and are mutually visible, where people participate in work as long as it is at all possible, where they are cared for in the family as long as they are alive, where they not only die in the presence of those who are near and dear to them but also at a place near and dear to them, where cemeteries are as central and visible as any other social institution, and where the physically and mentally deviant are a part of normal social life. Since all these differences are highly correlated with the conventional traditional/modern distinction used in many analyses of contemporary and historical social reality this spatial segregation cannot be just a coincidence. Nor can it only be seen as measures to make productive work more effective, for many of these measures are of such a kind that they do not appreciably contribute to productivity (for instance the segregated location of institutions, asylums, etc.), and are even sometimes quite costly. Rather, they should/could be interpreted as measures of purification that filter out everything abnormal and deviant from the general historical trend, leaving behind only that which is consonant with the Idea of Progress.

## (2) The problem of war and collective death.

Wars and other forms of collective death (epidemic diseases, earthquakes, tsunamis and other sudden and violent natural phenomena) are hard to conceal, and generally have to be dealt with in another way. Here it should be emphasized that if they tend to take place in the world periphery, particularly in less developed areas then they will reinforce rather than weaken the Idea of Progress. If wars can be seen as that which accrues to the less developed and similarly for the other phenomena then they would not be underreported but overreported in order to serve as a contrast. Since violent natural phenomena are particularly frequent in zones around the equator which also for several reasons are the zones where less developed countries are located, there is a correlation built into the present world structure that can be used for this purpose. Moreover, after the Second World War it may also look to many (for instance to Robert McNamara in his famous study) as if wars take place disproportionately much in less developed areas, because one confuses the theater of war with participants, and participants with causes.

However, there are incidences of war where these mechanisms simply do not work: the First World War, the Second World War and the Indo-China Wars, particularly as fought by the United States. They are not interpreted into an existant picture that makes them acceptable from an Idea of Progress point of view but are taken out of their social context and seen as aberrations, deviations, as abnormal phenomena. The First World War is referred to as "unnecessary", the Second World War is referred to as "a mad man's work" and the Vietnam War as "a tragic mistake". Mathematically speaking they are seen as the stochastic error term in the equation, as something that has to be taken into account but is accidental, not essential to history. As pointed out above:

civilizations with more cyclical time concepts will more easily
incorporate them into their understanding of what is natural.
But they would also more easily accept them as inevitable
whereas Idea of Progress cultures will see them as avoidable
(only progress is unavoidable), and create all kinds of
institutions full of optimism that it is possible to eradicate
these turbulences in the even stream of progress. The diffi-
culty is, of course, that in trying to do so there is one
type of understanding of war that will be very difficult to
accept: that wars are essentially caused by the factors that
make up that very progress and cannot be seen as something
unrelated to progress itself. Needless to say, the more
profoundly that assumption is challenged, the more deeply
wars are seen as inherent in that process the more will there
be a search for new cosmologies and eschatologies, of a less
linear nature.

A typical and important illustration of these processes
is the interpretation of Adolf Hitler. Germany exhibited and
still exhibits,very many of the phenomena here rubricized under
the heading of progress. It was also the place that made it
possible for Hitler to unfold himself. The most convenient
way of dealing with this from the point of view of the Idea
of Progress would include at least these three elements:
Hitler as mad, a theory of mass psychosis related to the
particular situation of Germany after defeat in a major war
and exposed to a major depression, and a reference to atavistic
elements in German culture, atypical of general western civili-
zation - such as "Bavarian mystique". An elaboration of all
these factors makes it possible to explain the terror that is
associated with the name of Hitler, within and without Nazi
Germany, and to encapsulate the phenomenon in a parenthesis
that does not challenge the idea of progress and makes it
possible to cut it out of the otherwise healthy body of western
development in general and German development in particular.

Another way of looking at Hitler would not deny all these
elements but would also see Hitler as an apotheosis, an epitome
of westernness. For this some conceptions of westernness are
needed (see mini-memo no. 6 ), and they would include the Idea
of Progress, not to mention the missionary zeal. There may be
circles interested in using this type of compatibility between
westernness and Hitler to exonerate Hitler, but one might also
make use of Hitler to see the west in a clear perspective
provided by the caricature.

(3) The problem of stagnation.

Everything said above notwithstanding there is no doubt
that the Idea of Progress runs into the difficulty of stagnation.
Quantitative growth along one or more variables may simply stop
for a shorter period, a longer period or forever. How could one
cope with that - how, for instance, would one deal with a zero
economic growth from the point of view of the Idea of Progress?

This is the point where an auxiliary hypothesis is needed within that general time cosmology. It must be possible to say that the Idea of Progress, interpreted almost as something material, can literally speaking jump from one variable to the other. It may reside in the bundle of variables associated with socio-economic growth for a century or two, and may then make a qualitative jump to another bundle of variables indicated by such terms as equality/justice/equity. For the Idea of Progress as such is not specific when it comes to the content of the variables, only with their form as they relate to time. Thus, from the general point of view of the Idea of Progress the marxist notion of a breakdown of capitalistic, accumulative, growth-oriented society and a transcendence into a completely new type of society, call it socialist or communist or anything else, with a completely new focus, is certainly not incompatible with an Idea of Progress. The only thing that would be incompatible with that idea would be that history would somehow come to an end with the stagnation just mentioned; certainly not that the stream of progress finds itself a new river bed and breaks a new course discontinuous with the past.

To conclude: it should perhaps be emphasized that the Idea of Progress epistomologically should not be seen as an ideology like capitalism or socialism, but more like a law of nature, or a basic principle of nature, something akin to the Second law of thermodynamics. That which is contrary to the Idea of Progress is unnatural and should be dealt with as such. That which is compatible with the Idea of Progress is real, and should be conceived of as such. A proposal with an element of progress in it always merits attention; proposals contrary to what most people would consider progress would not be taken seriously. This, incidentally, should not be confused with traditional "conservative versus radical" arguments, for it looks today as if the conservatives are those who most fervently adhere to progress in the conventional sense, whereas radicals are exactly those who have their doubts and are searching for other forms. A major question, therefore, is whether radicals in present day western civilization only transform the Idea of Progress and place it on top of other variables and phenomena so to speak, or challenge the Idea of Progress itself.

ON WESTERNNESS

The point of departure chosen here in trying to come to grips with western civilization will be to make use of the fundamental categories of time and space. Thus, the basic assumption is that in the west there has, even for a long time, been some very fundamental assumptions as to how time and space are structured. More particularly, there has been the assumption that west has a particular place or role in time and space, an asymmetric location so to speak.

When it comes to time there are at least three separate ideas. First, social time is seen to originate somewhere in the west, roughly in the big river cultures, symbolized by the names of Adam and Eve. Second, time has an arrow, it is linear, and there are signs of amelioration - the Idea of Progress. And third: there will be apocalyptic events in the near future, improvement or deterioration, even total salvation or total damnation. In short: one is living on an upward slope, but right ahead, in the very near future, lies the Moment of Truth: a promise of perfection on the one hand, the threat of extinction on the other. Mildly speaking, this would mean that Western Man leads a dramatic life, with an apocalyptic responsibility on his shoulders.

Next , when it comes to space there are similar assumptions. There is the idea that the center of space is located in the west, not necessarily in the area where time started, not necessarily at a stable point, but certainly not outside west in an extended sense. West is the center from which everything of importance originates, the rest of the world is a periphery relative to west. Second, just as for time there is the idea of a process, that westernness will spread and eventually encompass the whole world, from the center. And third, there is the sense of strong spatial discontinuity, between the pure on the inside and the impure on the outside, "we" and "they", Christians and pagans, MDC's and LDC's.

Thus, this is an effort to portray western images of time and space in a similar way so that they have three ideas in common: a zero point, a point of origin or a center located in the west; a process emanating linearly from this point of origin; and the idea of a strong discontinuity between now and then (in the future), and here and there (in the distance). The similarity is important for it may be argued that one configuration of this type will support the other, that there will be a carry-over from time to space and vice versa.

Concretely, what does this mean? Translated into more common sensical terms it may be said to mean the following:

(1) The Idea of Progress combined with an Apocalypse
(2) The Missionary Idea, and
(3) The Idea of the Singularist Nation State or Superstate

If one should try to summarize westernness in three key expressions

this would be one suggestion. Let us then try to spell them
out.

With the Idea of Progress time is given a definite arrow,
and the west is floating on top of the stream of time. The
second point is the idea that they are also flowing into space,
partly as a fact - they <u>are</u> flowing - partly as a command, it
is their historical task to do so and make others similar to
themselves. Nowhere does it take such a clear form as in
Matthew 28: 19-20 (Missionary Command), but this form is repeated
over and over again throughout western history, e.g. in the "Develop-
ment Command".

It should be emphasized that a sense of having and carrying
out a mission is not the same as a sense of superiority. One
may feel superior to the barbarians, yet let the barbarians
stew in their own juice. In fact, one may feel so superior to
the barbarians that they are not even worthy of being converted;
it may take the Christian/western conception of <u>all</u> men (eventually
also women) as equal to/under God to make the idea of conversion
meaningful. More charitable views of western civilization would
emphasize this point, that individuals, peoples and countries
are at least considered equal in the sense that all the others
are candidates for conversion, change, development. Less
charitable views would emphasize the rather obvious imperialistic
aspect of this conception of space.

Then there is the idea of the <u>sharp discontinuity</u>. On the
other side of the fence are the pagans, the Turks, the Russians,
the Communists, the Underdeveloped and so on. It is mandatory
that they should all be changed. It is not merely that they are
different from us and we are better; it is that our being western
is conditioned on their change in our direction. This does not
necessarily imply that the periphery should also be exploited
although this certainly was what happened and happens. Rather,
the basic idea seems to be that western man should not feel at
ease before the impure has been driven out of the world and the
world has been purified; the convertible converted and the rest
eliminated.

A special form of this is the ideology of the <u>nation state</u>.
Here there is also <u>sorting</u>, those of one kind (nation) in one box
(state), those of another kind in another box. The western
conception of space expresses itself in the first run in the
universal validity claimed for the nation state idea, in the
effort to impose upon the rest of the world the same singularist
nation-state      structure, for instance by means of a doctrine
of self-determination. In the longer run, however, there is the
idea of a nation-state yielding   to a world-state, a nation-state
writ at large for the human race, when human beings all over
the world have become sufficiently similar, i.e. sufficiently
western. The assumption, then, is that the center of this world-state
is the West.

And that is one image of the culminating event: <u>civitas dei</u>,
but in this world, as a fulfillment of time, and ruled from the
center of space. There is only one alternative: the extinction
of the human race. World government or atomic death! - One world
or none! - are typically western expressions: the alternatives

are western, and they are formulated as alternatives in an apocalyptic way.

At this point it may be useful to spell out what would be a non-western approach, in order to define westernness through its negation.

Thus,

-there would be no Idea of Progress. History would be conceived of in a more "relaxed" way, with ups and downs. The downs would be less apocalyptic, and there would be no "Phoenix rising from the ashes" complex.

and/or

-there would be no missionary idea. The validity of one's own society - structure and/or cosmology - would not be contingent upon what happens in the societies. Others may be seen as superior, inferior, at the same level or incomparable. They may occupy or be occupied, interact or ignore but not try to change or convert. As conquerors they may be as brutal as the moguls but not so missionary as the British - for instance in dealing with India. For that reason they would not care to eradicate others simply because they refuse to become like themselves.

and/or

-there would be no emphasis on sorting people in similar and dissimilar, and the dissimilar into convertible and non-convertible. There would be room for different kinds in one pluralistic state, small or big.

If the connective and is used above, then one arrives at cultures with little or no structuring of time and space. Time is flat or undulating, and space is symmetrical or restricted to one's own society; neither in time, nor in space is there a center located in oneself. If there is a sense of drama then it is perennial and intrinsic, not apocalyptic and relative to future time and distant space.

## ON DENSITY

Since the tremendous increase in population in recent centuries, not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world, is a dominant feature of contemporary world history some general ideas as to the significance of population density should be explored. Exactly what role does it play whether density is high or low, whether people live "tett" or "spredt" as it is expressed in Norwegian? The following are some suggestions.

### (1) Oceanic versus urban modes of social existence.

A Europe largely covered by forest with a relatively speaking small population concentrated in towns and villages is more similar to an ocean with some ships on it, whereas the Europe of today is more similar to a city or to a conurbation, to use the term the Dutch make use of to refer to their own country. Elizabethan England was like an ocean with townships and estates being the vessels; people stayed there during the winter, there was little communication from one to the other, they were even like vessels drifting in densely packed ice. In Victorian England this was already changed and what today is referred to as a county was within reach by horse-drawn carriages, and attained more urban characteristics.

With a very low level of population density nature becomes like a medium in which the human habitat is suspended; it is not identical with the human habitat. To proceed from one town or village to another is not impossible, but it is a risky adventure - land pirates being at least as frequent as sea pirates in large periods of navigation history. The ease with which one can proceed from A to B today is seen as something as trivial as the air around us, yet it constitutes one of the major transition phenomena in human history. It is made possible by a density high enough to transform nature from the oceanic to the conurbation model, with a shared interest in freedom of motion, and hence with nowhere to hide for the pirates.

But this mobility is gained at the expense of sharp discontinuities in nature: borders. The emergence of borders as salient and scrupulously protected lines drawn through nature must somehow be related to increasing population density. The net result is well known: easy mobility within the confines of the state, sometimes also within big regions; mobility impeded between visible and invisible borderlines, sometimes down to zero.

The only thing that has prevented this from happening to the oceans is the low density of ships, oil drilling contrivances

and ocean floor contraptions; not to mention the inexplorability
and inexploitability of the ocean floor - so far. As this state
of ignorance is now coming to an end it is only to be expected
that there will not only be borderlines on the ocean floor (the
midline principle), but that these borderlines will also in
practice (and later on in theory) project up to the ocean surface.
The surface ships patrolling the ocean floor with sonar recording
devices will ipso facto also be patrolling the ocean surface.

## (2) Aggressiveness versus apathy.

It is customary today to talk about increased population
density as something heavily related to aggressiveness. There
are certainly conditions under which this is true, but in
general it seems to be more correct to associate extremely high
levels of population density with apathy. Various sociological
and social psychological experiments point clearly in that
direction: both physical and mental activities tend to dwindle
away as if the lack of physical action space also serves to
truncate any other type of action space. Ultimately this may
result in a self-destructiveness which would be compatible with
the general aggressiveness hypothesis but serve to explain, for
instance, suicide rather than homicide.

But before that level is attained there is probably an
interval where aggressiveness is a likely consequence, particularly
before some more permanent formula for dividing the territory has
been established.

From this, however, it certainly should not be inferred that
low population density is associated with low aggressiveness.
Under that condition expansion, change, dynamism would also be
expected, and in the weight of such phenomena a tendency to
eradicate that which stands in the way might certainly take
highly aggressive forms. Thus, in general there seems to be
a relatively meagre theoretical basis for assuming any simple
linear relationship between population density and aggression
propensity. The relationship is much more complex, to say the least.

## (3) Population density and the openness of the future.

With low population density there is at least a potential
future perspective which is very obvious: fill space! This is
something that strikes a northern European visiting the Mediterranean
literal, or Japan, many southeast Asian countries and in fact many
places of the world: it looks as if nothing is unexplored, there
is a fingerprint on every stone, there are footprints everywhere,
everything has been turned upside down many times, rotated around,
all permutations have already been tried out. Any future pattern
will have to be the repetition of something from the past except
for less essential elements that can be added. There may be
something to explore, but that something lies in the inside of
the human mind, it takes the form of innovation and creation,
it is not immediately and directly related to nature.

Intuitively, one would expect this to play a role in influencing time perspective. More particularly, it should have an impact on one particular dimension of time: the division of time into past and future. The lower the density of population, the more untouched nature there is, the more one would assume people intuitively to feel that "there is more future than past". And vice versa: if everything has already been explored, all points have been settled, and close to maximum density has been attained, a feeling of having no dynamic, only a static, future may spread.

WHY THIS PROJECT?

There are four different points of departure for this project, and although they will no doubt not only be more clarified in the process, and also be changed in the whole dialectics of research, it may be worthwhile at this stage to try to present them.

(1) <u>Macrohistory as a starting point.</u>

Macrohistory is, of course, an effort to see the longer trends in human history, to try to catch basic aspects of the human diachrony - just as comparative social science and international relations are two different approaches to the human synchrony (differential and relational respectively). But it should be emphasized that this would not only be an effort to try to <u>compare</u> centuries, epochs, eras, but certainly also to <u>relate</u> them causally. For that reason the comparison is more with international relations, and particularly with the way this field has developed under the heading of peace research - an effort to penetrate into the causal nexus not respecting such systematizing principles as borderlines between nations.

In order to conceive of macrohistory it may be useful to explore two metaphors.

Thus, imagine that one is standing at the corner of a street and an avenue in New York City, watching the traffic pass by. What one sees looks chaotic, but it also looks profoundly human. The faces of the drivers are grim with frustration, some are smiling in despair, others look like they have given up. There are jerks of motion in the mass of cars, there are pedestrians breaking paths between them, there are exclamations, an occasional honking of the horn, the fumes of exhaust, sometimes the whining of brakes. No doubt there is a general movement in the prescribed direction, but the whole thing looks very far from smooth. But then again: it is human, one can identify with the human actors, with what their hands and feet do, one can infer something about the mental processes behind it, and so on.

Then, take the elevator up the adjoining skyscraper in order to get the view of the situation from a convenient distance, high up. The whole picture changes. It now looks smooth: the cars appear on straight lines, now rolling, now standing still, the sound and fury does not reach up to the altitudes, and there is nothing human at all in the process. The cars could just as well have been electronically as humanly steered. The flow can be analysed as in hydrodynamics, for instance using Poiseuille's Law predicting higher velocity in the middle than on the sides where there are dissipating forces; some kind of car friction (an illegally parked car, a car turning too slowly to the left or to the right, a jaywalking pedestrian, etc).

The other image looks similar but is actually very
different: the difference between micro and macrometeorology.
The latter is well known: the gigantic phenomena described
in weather maps and explained by means of very complex and
elaborate theories.  The former would deal with such phenomena
as whether the rain mainly falls to the north, east, west or
south of a given tree, how humidity varies with minute details
in the ecology, and so on.  Needless to say, macrometeorology
does not necessarily have to take into account all the details
revealed through micro meteorological studies, but conceives
of phenomena in more gross terms.  But there is a difference
of some significance between this image and the preceeding one:
macro-meteorological insight is not qualitatively very different
from micro-meteorological insight, whereas the view of traffic
from the top of a skyscraper and the theories developed in that
connection were about trends and appear extremely smooth (since
one does not register the reactions  of the individual car driver,
only the flow of cars.) It is qualitatively different from the
view and perspective developed below.  The difference is this:
down at the street level what happens is explainable in terms of
concrete human action, here and now - what is seen from above
is explainable in terms of general laws where human actors can
be abstracted away.  Can be, they do not have to be abstracted
away since what happens also can be seen as a continuous
smoothening of an infinity of discontinuous human actions that
somehow add up to the observed flow. But individuals disappear in that
image.

Thus, the strong point about macro history as taken out
of these metaphors is its ability to abstract away from detail,
to see big lines and trends, to see the major terms in the
equation and not the minor ones, the error terms, the noise,
the"stochastic" elements.  And the weak point is equally clear:
precisely in doing so one abstracts away from human reality and
constructs a system where human beings with all their strengths
and weaknesses have disappeared and been replaced by impersonal,
"objective" forces.

This means that the major challenge may be not so much
to work towards a macrohistorical conception or systematization,
but towards a synthesis of micro and macro history.  And this
immediately raises a major problem: how to construct a bridge
between micro- and macro -history, how to make the big macro-trends
relevant for the action that takes place at the micro level, in
the limited region of time and space in which people exist as
real human beings? How do trends translate into human action?

One way of doing this, of course, is to break history into
periods and give in some narrative form an account of how far
the trends have come in this or that period, providing a back-
ground for human action.  This is not a satisfactory solution,
however, and hardly the final answer to the problem.

(2) The present state of western civilization.

One point of departure here is a strong feeling that

western civilization is not only in an internal crisis, but that
this crisis also spread to the rest of the world, partly because
western civilization is spread all over, partly because of the
ring effect from the center presently constituted in the West.
In one generation the West has produced Stalin, Hitler and Nixon
and what they stand for in terms of eradication of those who are
in their way, and in terms of building gigantic, inhuman systems.
Inside the West considerable energy is poured into exploring
and emphasizing the differences between these three phenomena;
another point of view would be to look at their similarities -
and they are more clearly seen from a vantage point located
outside West.

In short, the point of departure argued here is to ask
the question: where do we stand today in the development of
western civilization?  We do not have to assume a biological,
organism analogy with birth, growth, maturity, senescence and
death in order to ask such a question; all we need is the
rather obvious assumption that "nothing is eternal".  But if
one had a longitudinal theory of society, of civilizations, like
Marx, Sorokin and Toynbee have developed, or possibly some
synthesis of these adding some new elements, one might also
be able to phrase the question more meaningfully and give more
meaningful answers.  It is trivially true that social phenomena
have to be understood in their spatial context and as part of
a historical process; but in order to make this statement less
trivial a theory about the historical process is needed.  In
order to understand what happens inside West and along the
borderline between West and non-West <u>today</u> such a theory is
indispensable.  It could be a contribution to western self-
understanding, and impossible to develop unless some comparisons
are made with non-western civilizations (e.g. Indian, Chinese,
Japanese), and the cooperation of non-western historians is
elicited in order to see ourselves through their eyes.

(3) <u>History as a function of world structure.</u>

In a world populated by mutually isolated local communities
the science of history would take the form of local history, one
for each community, running parallel to each other.  If they do
not interact a common chronology would be less meaningful, for
it would not matter whether phenomenon X in community A and
phenomenon Y in community B took place at the same or different
points in chronological time.  Of course, one could make compara-
tive local history in an effort to establish similarities and
dissimilarities between the diachronies of these communities,
but that will be the closest one could come to "world history".
Each community would be in search of its own understanding and
hire historians to produce exactly that.  If they were really
isolated from each other then it would not only be impossible
to establish comparative local history, it would also be completely
meaningless.

In the next stage these local communities somehow integrate
into nation states with a relatively clear center in the capital, and
with periphery elsewhere.  History-writing, then, becomes the

story of this process, of how the "nation was born" and very often written from a center point of view. As long as world interaction is low world history would still tend to take the form of comparative nation history, and this is the stage where history books to a large extent have arrived today.

However, there is obviously also much about the relations between the states, not only about their similarities and dis-similarities. But the history of this system of interaction is still not what one should identify with "world history" - it is still exactly what it is often called: the history of inter-national relations. In this approach diplomatic history and the history of war and peace between elites in various states takes a disproportionate place.

What, then, should one mean by "world history"? There seem to be two answers that can be given to this question, one of them unsatisfactory, the other one more interesting - and the latter is the answer that we want to make use of as a guide for the present project.

The first approach would be simply to see the world as a nation state at large and report elements of world state building. There would be heavy emphasis on such phenomena as the League of Nations and the United Nations because they look familiar from a nation-state point of view.

The second answer would be to focus on "non-territorial actors" rather than on the territorial actors, local and national communities. For instance, one could write the history of what it has been like to be a child in the world, to be a woman, to be a worker and so on. One can see the world in terms of groups and categories that span worldwide rather than in terms of territorially defined units. Obviously, such a perspective on the world is only meaningful under certain conditions, and these conditions seem increasingly to be satisfied. As a result of the transportation and communication revolutions nonterritorial actors become increasingly world encompassing, bringing together those who are similar or who have similar interests. And this poses the question: what kind of historians would produce what kind of history for their self-understanding? How would they differ from other historians, what will be their tools, their methodological assumptions and so on?

In short, we have tried to see history writing as a function of world structure, sometimes ahead of it, very often behind. And one purpose of the present project is to explore what kind of new meaning could be given to the term "world history", who would be the target audience for that type of history writing, what kind, and whose self-understanding would one like to contribute to.

(4) <u>Peace research as a point of departure.</u>

Peace research is a highly value-oriented discipline. It is concerned with human self-realization, and conceives of violence as anything that stands in its way. Hence, its focus is on various types of violence through history, their structure and configuration.

As history proceeds some types of violence are reduced or eliminated (for instance, the danger of land and sea piracy), other types come into the foreground of the social consciousness (for instance exploitation) or appear as new phenomena (for instance air piracy). History, thus, can be seen as a rolling agenda where goals related to the general goal of self-realization are born, achieve maturity and wane into oblivion, either because they are satisfied or because they are forgotten, for instance because they are superceded by other goals.

In studying this peace research of course not only focuses on goals, but on social reality and sees the latter in the light of the former (and to a large extent also vice versa). So far peace research has only done this in a static, synchronic manner; it has not been done on a long-term basis, as a real process. Some short-term processes related to the onslaught of capitalism in its imperialistic form in the Third World today have been studied, but that does not constitute any answer to the general problem. For this reason there should be a double payoff here: a deeper understanding in peace research of where we are not only in terms of the processes in material social reality but also in the processes in which goals are embedded; and for history a critical perspective, a grilling grid so to speak thrown over the historical process, wrought by the tools provided by the sets of goals and values a peace researcher might like to bring to bear on it.

## (5) Future studies as a point of departure.

Future studies is in one sense certainly not a scientific discipline since there are no data to bring into the scientific process. In another sense it is disciplined, rigorous in the sense of being explicit: values are made explicit and theories as to what might be viable are made explicit, the two are then contrasted with each other to arrive at some estimate of what might be potential reality in the future. Here this is brought in as one more point of departure in an effort to make a plea for a bridge not only between the study of the past and the study of the present (made in the preceding point from the point of view of peace research), but also for a bridge between these two and the study of the future. Thus, to what extent can one make use of the same variables? What does it mean "to learn from the past"? Or more profoundly, to what extent can the study of the past benefit from "knowledge" of the future? Needless to say, in all this there is the danger of extrapolationism forward and backward in time, that the idea of using the same variables creates an artificial similarity and hence a false perspective. It will only be meaningful if ample consideration is given to the significance of discontinuous jumps, not only in a variable, but from one bundle of variables to another - providing for completely new perspectives on new epochs in history.

In conclusion, some words about the methodology of this project - over and above what has already been said before (mini-memo no. 1).

Since the project is about social reality in a macro-
historical sense it is obvious that concrete human actors will
somehow recede into the background - they carnot be caught in
a macrohistorical grid as effectively as in the network provided
by microhistorical thinking. Social reality, hence, has to be
understood at least in two terms: in terms of social structure
and in terms of social cosmology. In order to describe and
discuss this  two vocabularies are needed. In principle
sociologists and other social scientists should have delivered
the tools for the former, and the historians of ideas and
philosophers the tools for the latter. In practice it is not
so simple; it looks as if tools have to be fabricated as the
project proceeds. The basic questions are: which are the
categories in which we shall try to conceive of a social structure,
which are the categories needed to describe nan's conception of
how the fundamental elements, for instance space and time,
are constituted and related? The development of these vocabularies
will be a fundamental part of the project.